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INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomics is concerned with the overall economic structure and per­
formance of a nation. The understanding o f macroeconomics is o f crucial 
importance due to its impact on analyzing economic well-being, government 
policy, and economic decisions made by individuals. On the other hand, the 
importance of international economics has never been as clear as it is today 
due to the fact that the economies of different nations in the world are more 
closely linked to each other now than ever before. This linkage takes the form 
of international movements of goods and services, labor, money, and technol­
ogy. Therefore, one country’s overall economic performance and policy can has 
significant effects on other nations’ economies. The purpose of this disserta­
tion is to study the important subjects under macroeconomics and international 
economics, respectively.
The first chapter, entitled “Dumping in a Linder Model o f Trade,” provides 
an explanation for a recent proliferation o f price dumping and antidumping 
laws. The last decade has witnessed an accelerating adoption of antidumping 
(AD) laws by the less developed coimtries (LDCs) and their increasing usage 
against the developed coimtries (DCs). This is explained by a model o f third 
degree price discriminations with heterogenous consumers that have differing 
preferences for quality in the two countries. Duopolistic interaction may yield 
bilateral or unilateral dumping in either direction under free trade. Even when
dumping is unidirectional, there is a compelling basis for the introduction o f AD 
laws by both governments. This mitigates competition, which is beneficial for 
both firms, and portends pessimism for an abatement of this recent proliferation 
o f AD laws and complaints.
The second chapter is entitled “Inflation and Credibility o f Monetary Policy; 
The Case of Inflation Targeting” which investigates the credibility o f monetary 
policy under inflation targeting regime. Credibility has become an important 
issue in the setting of monetary policy because it can dramatically increase 
the policy effectiveness. The goal of this paper is to capture the evolution o f 
the credibility o f monetary policy as well as the policymaker’s intention in the 
recent adoption o f inflation targeting regime. Through the technique o f a state 
space representation and Kalman filtering, the results indicate that monetary 
authority’s credibility in fighting inflation has Improved after the adoption of 
inflation targeting. However, the credibility in countries without explicit targets 
has also been raised. We conclude that keeping a good track record of low 
inflation may be better than merely announcing target in achieving credibility.
Chapter 1
Dumping in a Linder Model
of Trade
1 Introduction
Prior to the I990’s, the primary utilizers of the Antidumping (AD) Code o f the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) 
were Australia, Canada, the EC , and the United States. As a recent article in 
The Economist indicates, that is beginning to change. In 1997, South Africa 
ranked third in new AD cases initiated, and both Argentina and South Korea 
initiated more cases than Canada. Furthermore, Mexico, China, India, Thailand, 
and Indonesia have recently introduced substantial numbers of cases. Interest­
ingly, developed countries (DCs), such as the U.S., Germany, Japan, and the 
U.K., are among the nine most frequent targets o f AD complaints. China, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and India comprise the rest.
A concern that is frequently voiced is that the proliferation o f AD com­
plaints by the signatories of the AD Code will undermine the success o f the 
GATT/WTO in lowering average world tariffs. This is underscored by the 
above mentioned increasing reliance of less developed countries (LDCs) upon 
the Code, and the average level o f the AD duties that are implemented. The 
Economist reports that between 1980 and 1997, 71 percent of the AD claims 
in the EC and 80 percent o f the petitions in the U.S. were successful. Between 
1991 and 1995, average duties in the EC and the U.S. were 29 percent and 57 
percent, respectively*.
‘For additional evidence, see Boltuck and Litan (1991).
Although the DCs have a lengthy history o f reliance upon AD laws, and the 
AD Code o f  the GATT/WTO was patterned after U.S. law, this paper contends 
that LDCs may have the more compelling basis for Introducing AD laws-. The 
demonstration is in the context of a Linder (1961) model o f trade. In such a 
model, a firm manufactures a product in accordance with the preferences o f the 
majority o f the consumers in its local market, and exports to satisfy the minority 
of consumers with those preferences In the other country. To develop the Linder 
model, we adapt Corts' (1998) model o f third degree price discrimination in 
a duopoly. The model assumes that there are two types of consumers in each 
country: those that are sensitive to quality and those that are not. The latter 
base their consumption decision solely upon price. The high quality producer is 
located in the DC and the low quality producer is situated in the LDC. Thus we 
have vertical product differentiation'. Most consumers in the DC are sensitive 
to quality, most in the LDC are not. This may, as in the Linder model, be a result 
o f income differences. The high quality producer sells to the most sensitive and 
the low quality producer sells to the least sensitive o f those consumers that are 
responsive to quality in each market. As in the Linder model, firms produce for 
the mass market in the country in which they are located. The Linder model 
readily accommodates this intraindustry trade.
Through taking account o f the distributions o f consumer preferences in the 
two countries, we find that we may generate unilateral price dumping by the DC
^Australia introduced an AD law in 1903, and the U.S. did so in 1916.
^The vertical differentiation could be a result o f  the DC firm producing a more sophisticated 
version of the product. The DC product could embody a more advanced technology, or it could 
entail a lower probability o f failure.
duopolist in the LDC market, unilateral price dumping by the LDC duopolist 
in the DC market, or bilateral price dumping*. Although quality insensitive 
consumers pay the same price in each country, the distributions o f the quality 
sensitive consumers will determine the pattern of dumping that emerges^. This 
pattern will determine which o f the governments has a justification for intro­
ducing an AD law. Thus we portray a two stage game in which governments 
choose whether or not to introduce AD laws in stage one and firms set prices 
in stage two. When firms set prices to circumvent the AD law at its rival’s 
government, they in many cases gain relative to free trade**. Thus there is a 
basis for concern that the governments of LDCs will continue the recent trend 
of the introduction of unfair international trade laws".
The paper continues by providing a free trade benchmark for Linder trade. It 
then considers the pattern o f dumping that can emerge, followed by a discussion 
o f the decision to introduce an AD law by the governments.
2 The Literature
'See Goldberg and Knetter (1999) for evidence that (national) price discrimination, or pricing 
to market, is a common manifestation for most manufactured goods.
'’Contrast this to the reciprocal dumping, generated by oligopolistic interaction, o f  Grander 
and Krugman (1983), and the universal dumping model of Murray and Turdaliev (1999). Both 
o f  these models pertain to homogeneous goods.
"This may be regarded as a collusive equilibrium. Other papers that have established that 
AD laws may contribute to collusion are Hartigan (1995), Prusa (1992), and Staiger and Wolak 
(1992). For a counter example in which an AD law undermines collusion, see Hartigan (2000).
^An alternative explanation for the increasing reliance o f LDCs on AD laws to restrain 
trade is that they have enhanced their political sophistication through experiencing the DCs’ 
use the GATT/WTO AD Code against them. That is, they have learned to use the Code to their 
advantage. We view our model to be complementary to this view.
Since Viner’s (1923) explanations for dumping, the traditional theory o f dump­
ing examines the occurrence of dumping as profit maximization by monopolists 
under price discrimination between two national markets. This theory requires 
two conditions: monopoly and protection. However, the allegation o f this form 
of dumping is rarely found in tlie real world and protection has been the goal 
rather than the cause. Ethier (1982) has launched the modem theory o f diunping 
by looking at different ankles o f dumping phenomenon. He demonstrated that 
profit-maximizing firms with common technology and high fixed costs may set 
prices below average costs in cyclical downturns. That is, dumping has occurred 
in response to a decline in demand in the foreign country. Hillman and Katz 
(1986), on the other hand, investigated the motivation of setting a below-cost 
price under domestic demand uncertainty. They have shown that the presence 
o f domestic uncertainty with different forms may impart a pro-dumping bias 
to firms’ output decisions. As a result, contingent on the form that domestic 
uncertainty takes, either an additive or multiplicative form, risk-neutral firms 
may sell output abroad at below marginal cost. The expected magnitude of 
dumping, therefore, is determined by the forms of domestic uncertainty.
Another explanation on motivation o f sustained below-cost price is known as 
predatory dumping. It involves an oligopolistic competition in the home country 
with or without the foreign firm being a monopolist in the foreign country. The 
foreign firm sets below-cost price in the home country in order to eliminate 
competition or deter entry from the home firm. This form of dumping requires 
either incomplete information, demonstrated by Hartigan (1994), or financial 
market imperfection, investigated by Hartigan (1996). In Hartigan (1994), due
to the existence o f incomplete and asymmetric information on firms’ cost, a 
foreign firm can signal its cost through a low first-period price to induce the 
exit of the domestic firm, a so called predatory dumping model. However, an 
antidumping law may affect the cost o f sending signals. It may raise the cost 
and force the foreign firm to charge the same price in all markets. On the other 
hand, Hartigan ( 1996) has demonstrated that a foreign firm may charge a below- 
cost price to induce the exit o f the domestic firm through the financial market 
imperfection. By taking advantage o f the asymmetry in financial resources that 
benefits the foreign firm, it is able to utilize profits from the foreign market to 
engage predatory dumping.
The nature o f oligopolistic interaction also provides explanations o f dumping 
behavior. Grander and Krugman (1983) have shown that oligopolistic interac­
tion between firms can naturally give rise to reciprocal dumping, the two-way 
trade in the same product. In particular, firms in each country producing the 
same commodity charge a lower price in the foreign market than the price 
charged in the domestic market under Coumot competition. Without free entry, 
the resulting welfare is ambiguous, depending on transport costs. However, 
with free entry and Coumot behavior, reciprocal dumping unambiguously in­
creases welfare. Murray and Turdaliev (1999) expanded the model o f Grander 
and Krugman (1983) and other similar models to incorporate several countries 
with several firms in each country. Following those models, they maintained 
the assumptions o f segmented markets, identical demands, and identical con­
stant marginal costs. They found that firms producing the same homogeneous 
good will export to other countries at prices below those charged in the home
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country. That is, if  firms export a homogeneous product, they always dump. 
They called this case ‘universal dumping." Gruenspecht (1988) has disclosed 
that below-cost sales may be profit maximizing for the unconstrained firm pro­
ducing a homogeneous good, through learning effects. He also investigated 
the effects of antidumping enforcement on the evolution o f learning industries. 
Unilateral antidumping enforcement raises the national welfare while mutual 
antidumping enforcement reduces national welfare. In general, the experience 
etTects and the relative size of national markets are the critical determinants of 
welfare incorporating antidumping enforcements.
Finally, in addition to the study o f Gruenspecht (1988), many other papers 
have analyzed the effect of antidumping laws on firms' strategic behavior as 
well as the market equilibrium. Hartigan (1995), Prusa (1992), and Staiger and 
Wolak (1992) have established that antidumping laws may induce collusion be­
tween domestic and foreign firms. Hartigan (1995) analyzed that the types of 
firms, high or low cost, can be revealed through a GATT mandated investiga­
tory procedure for dumping complaints. Through this exchanging information 
on costs, high cost firms benefit and low cost firms are harmed. Consequently, 
firm’s behavior toward dumping is affected by the injury and dumping existence 
decision. Prusa (1992) used a model o f the bargaining process to study the ef­
fects o f antidumping law implementation. He showed that many antidumping 
cases are resolved with settlement agreements and firms might use these agree­
ments to achieve collusive outcomes, which in turn will benefit both domestic 
and foreign firms. Therefore, antidumping petitions can serve as a vehicle to 
achieve cooperative profits. Based on the model o f cyclical dumping, Staiger
and Wolak (1992) have shown that antidumping petitions will be filed by the 
domestic firms whenever foreign demand is low and thus will reduce foreign 
firm’s trade volume to the domestic market. They also investigated the possibil­
ity o f self-enforcing agreements between firms. These agreements may reduce 
the filing o f antidumping petitions by the domestic firms as well as increase the 
capacity choice o f foreign firms which will increase the foreign trade volume 
from free trade. In contrast to the papers above showing that antidumping laws 
may induce collusion between firms, Hartigan (2000) has demonstrated that 
those laws may actually weaken firms’ incentives to collude. Starting from a 
collusive equilibrium of an infinite-horizon model with homogeneous duopoly, 
he showed that an antidumping law investigative process can serve as a vehi­
cle for the renegotiation o f collusion. Under fi'ee trade, costly renegotiation o f 
collusion will induce collusion. By providing a low-cost mechanism for the 
renegotiation o f collusion, an antidumping law with a weak injury standard can 
therefore undermine the incentive o f firms to collude. As a result, this will 
induce the foreign firm to dump and the domestic firm to defect.
3 Free Trade
Suppose that there are two countries, one of which is less developed (LDC) 
and the other is developed (DC). Their markets are segmented. There are two 
categories o f consumers in each country. High quality consumers are concerned 
with both the quality of a product and its price, whereas low quality consiuners 
are only sensitive to price. They are denoted by h  and I, respectively. The
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two categories o f consumers are served through separate distribution channels. 
While low quality consumers are homogeneous, high quality consumers are 
heterogeneous.
Furthermore, there is a duopolist producing a high quality product and a 
duopolist producing a low quality product. As in the case o f consumers, the 
high quality firm and its good are denoted by H, and the low quality firm 
and its good are indicated by L. The quality of differential o f the products 
is exogenously given by A  € /?+. Thus we have a vertically differentiated 
duopoly.
3.1 Quality-Sensitive Consumer Markets
For both countries, quality sensitive consumers are indexed by € 0  C (o, 0 
where 0 € R+. The index 6 indicates the preference for quality on the part 
o f type h consumers, where =  0 denotes those consumers that shop only 
on the basis of price. Thus, type h consumers are characterized by # > 0. 
Consumers are distributed according to /  {&) in the LDC and /*  (0) in the 
DC. The cumulative density functions are given by F  (0) and F* {6), where 
F (0 ) =  F* (0) =  0 and F  = F* = 1. They represent the fraction o f
consumers in each country with a preference o f less than 0. Moreover, F  {0) 
and F* {0) are both functions.
Consumers with preference 0 obtain utility o f v from consuming the low 
quality good, and v + 0 A  from consiuning the high quality good. Consumer 
surplus for preference 0 in the LDC is given by w -  from purchasing a unit
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of the low quality good, and u +  6 A  — p^' from purchasing a unit o f the high 
quality good. The price o f good i = H ,L  is given by p‘. Consumer surplus in 
the DC is correspondingly defined, using the asterisk (*).
To construct the Linder framework, we assume that F* {0) strictly first- 
order stochastically dominates F  {0), so that we can state that F  {&) > F* (ff). 
Further, there exist consumers that are indifferent between high and low quality 
goods in each country. These are denoted as having preference 0 in the LDC 
and Ô in the DC. Therefore, F (Ô  ^ and F* represent the percentage o f type 
h  consumers that choose the lower quality good in each country. Following 
Linder's model, we assume that a higher traction o f the most (least) quality 
sensitive consumers are located in the DC (LDC), such that I -  F  <  F  (ô) 
and I -  F* > F* . Therefore
F  (Ô) > F '  (g) . (1)
In addition, to complete the Linder structure, we assume that the high (low) 
quality duopolist is located in the DC (LDC). That is, producers manufacture 
the product that is relatively preferred by local consumers.
I'he demand fimctions for each good in each country are obtained by finding 
the consumers with 0 and 0 that are indifferent between the purchase of the two 
goods. That is, by setting v  -  = v  +  6>A -  we define
A  A
The solution for 0 and 0 permits the specification o f the demand functions
12
and
for each firm on the part o f quality sensitive consumers in the two countries:
4  = t  f { e )  de (3)
Jo
= F { e ) - F  [è] .
4  =  f f { e ) d O  (4)
JO
= F { 0 ) - F [ Q ) ,
In (3) and (4), V i =  //. L denotes sales by firm i to type h consumers. 
Once again, x//* and are obtained correspondingly. Noting that F = I 
and F  (0) =  0 permits profits generated in the LDC to be given by
’r;' = p ; . ' x ; ' = p ' ' ( i - F ( 9 ) )  (S)
and
= = P k P '{ê ) . (6)
The definition of parallels that of x},. Profits in DC, 7r,f * and are speci­
fied analogously. Assume that each firm's profit function is strictly concave in 
its own p r i c e , < 0. Best response functions are obtained by differentiating 
the profit functions with respect to own price and setting the result equal to 
zero. Solving the pair o f equations for and p^, by invoking (2), yields
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and
'  ( " )  =  7 ^ '  <*)
The best response functions and b^' are also given by this proce­
dure. Further, assume that the actions of firms are strategically complementary: 
that is. the cross-partial derivative o f firm i's profit function, where
i j  = H ,L  and i ^  j ,  is greater than zero. Denote the slopes o f b' and 6'* as 
/ /’ and 6"'. < 0 and > 0 indicate that b '^' and b'^*' > 1 and 0 <
and < 1 with respect to p‘' .
Determination o f the market equilibrium for type k  consumers is given by 
the intersection o f these best response functions, through the assumptions o f 
concavity o f profit functions and strategic complementarity. In addition, it
is easy to show that > . As a result, a noncooperative price
equilibrium exists and is unique. 6^ > U implies that in equilibrium
Kh > P t ,  (9)
where ^ d en o te  the equilibrium prices. The result that the firm producing the 
high quality goods commands a price premium is not surprising, as consumers 
that purchase from firm H  must be compensated for the higher price o f  the 
goods that they consume by a higher quality. On the other hand, if the low 
quality good is more expensive than the high quality good, consumers will 
not purchase the low quality one. A corresponding result for pfi* and is 
obtained for the DC, such that
14
fit > Pf ■ (10)
3.2 Quality-Insensitive Consumer Markets
By specifying the demand function of the quality insensitive consumers, type 
/, as <ii = a  -  i3pi and 7,’ =  a* -  the equilibrium prices for the quality 
insensitive consumers can then be ascertained. As type I consumers maximize 
their utility by only taking price into account, the equilibrium price is the classic 
Nash-Bertrand result of price equals marginal cost^:
p / ' =  p/— p / / ' =  p/"  =  0. (11)
That is, the firms’ effort to undercut each other drives price down to the level 
o f marginal cost. The is suppressed in subsequent discussion of equilibrium 
prices for parsimony of notation.
The model demonstrates that the high quality producer, located in the DC, 
exports to the LOG. In so doing, it sells to both quality sensitive and quality 
insensitive consumers. The low quality firm, located in the LDC, exports to the 
DC. It also sells to both types of consiuners. Each firm produces and exports 
the product that is relatively more desired in its own country. This is the essence 
o f the Linder model.
* Although the goods are vertically difTerentiated, they are regarded as homogeneous to type 
L  consumers in each country. This is because these consumers only are concerned with price. 
They derive the same utility v  from the consumption o f either good.
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4 Dumping
The AD Code of the GATT/WTO requires that two existence conditions be met 
for the sanctioning of AD duties. These are the existence o f material injury and 
the existence o f an unfair act. We will suppose that material injury is satisfied 
by the existence of sales at marginal cosf*^ . Thus either firm could be deemed 
injured through their aggressive competition to serve the quality insensitive type 
/ consumers. The AD Code permits dumping to be established by comparing 
the average export price to the average price it charges in its national market. 
It also permits the comparison o f prices through the matching o f individual 
transactions.
Since (11) discloses that prices are equal to zero in both countries for quality 
insensitive consumers, the existence of dumping requires that a firm serve type 
h consumers in the other country at a lower price than they are served at home. 
At this juncture, we introduce three propositions.
Proposition I In a Under model o j trade between a DC and a LDC, unilateral 
price dumping by the DC duopolist occurs when product-indifferent consumers 
in the two countries have relatively low and similar preferences.
From section 2, the best response functions of firm H  is in
LDC and 6"* =  in DC. There is high probability under first-order
stochastic dominance that for low values o f 6 and 0 , f  (0^ > f*  . Since
^ De Vault (1993) has disclosed that profits and market share are the two most important 
economic determinants in material injury decisions by the U.S. International Trade Commission.
'"For further discussion about the determination o f dumping margins under the GATT/WTO, 
see Stiglitz (1997).
16
I — F  (Ô  ^ < I — F* (Ô^, it unambiguously yields that < b"*. On the 
other hand, the best response functions o f firm L is 6^ =  in LDC and 
b^* =  in DC. If the difference between F  and F* is relatively
small so that F  > F* (0^ is offset by /  > /* (0^, then it yields
b^ < h^*.
Figure I.
Ph<Ph'
Ph
P h
b"
/
/ /
/)"•
4-
Ph Ph
b>'
b‘
P*". P h " '
That is, from Figure I, the equilibrium price charged by firm H in LDC is 
less than that in DC, pfl < p fl', and the equilibrium price charged by firm L  
in DC is greater than that in LDC, p^ < pj^*. Since firm H  is located in DC 
and firm L in LDC, firm H  dumps unilaterally in LDC.
When quality indifferent consumers have relatively weak preferences, the 
price differential must be low, given the exogenous quality differential. See 
equations (2). In such a circumstance, the duopolists compete aggressively for 
both quality sensitive and insensitive consumers. Further, the condition o f low
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and close values o f 6 and Ô implies that there is a relatively large number of 
quality sensitive consumers in both countries, while maintaining the assiunption 
that quality sensitive consumers with lower (higher) preferences occur in greater 
proportion in the LDC (DC). This implies that there is a higher market share and 
thus a profitable opportunity for firm H  in LDC. Therefore, it creates higher 
incentive for firm H  to engage in price dumping than firm L. However, firm H  
will charge a higher price than firm L because the loss in sales to the consumers 
that would be indifferent at Ô and Ô is more than compensated by the higher 
price charged to the inframarginal consumers.
If /  -  / •  is sufficiently large, the DC duopolist dumps in the LDC.
That is, it sells its product through the two distribution channels at a lower 
average price (recall equation (II)  discloses the price paid by quality insensitive 
consumers) in the LDC than in the DC. By the same reasoning, the LDC 
duopolist charges a higher average export price, since /  > /*  (Ô), than it
charges in its national market. Hence, we have unilateral dumping from the 
DC to the LDC.
Proposition 2 Unilateral price Jumping by the LDC duopolist occurs when 
product-indifferent consumers in DC and LDC have relatively high and similar 
prejerences, and the demand for higher quality good in LDC is relatively close 
to that in DC.
Under first-order stochastic dominance, there is high probability that /*  >
/  for large values o f 0 and 0. Since F  (0) > F* it unambiguously 
yields that >  fa^ *. If the difference between 1 -  F  ^0^ and 1 — F* ^0) is
18
relatively small so that 1 -  F  <  1 -  F* is offset by /*  >  /  (^), then
it yields b '^ > b“ '. As a result, from Figure 2, the equilibrium price charged 
by firm H  in LDC is greater than that in DC, pfl > p jl', and the equilibrium 
price charged by firm L in DC is less than that in LDC, pj^ * < pf;. Since 
firm L is located in LDC and firm H  in DC, firm L dumps unilaterally in DC. 
That is, firm H  charges a lower average price for export sales through the two 
distribution channels than it charges in its national market. Firm L exports at a 
higher average price than it charges at home.
In contrast to Proposition 1, the condition o f large and close values o f Ô and 
fj implies that there is a relatively large number o f quality insensitive consumers 
in both countries, while maintaining the assumption that quality sensitive con­
sumers with lower (higher) preferences occur in greater proportion in the LDC 
(DC). This implies that there is a higher market share and thus a profitable 
opportunity for firm L  in DC. Therefore, it creates higher incentive for firm L 
to engage in price dumping than firm H . The firms charge high prices because 
any lost sales to marginal (indifferent) consumers are compensated by increased 
revenue from sales to inframarginal consumers.
Figure 2.
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Proposition 3 Bilateral price Jumping by the LDC and DC duopolists occurs 
when product-indifferent consumers in DC have relatively high preferences while 
those in LDC have relatively low prejerences, or vice versa.
When ê is relatively small and Ô is relatively large or the reverse, /  (0^ and 
/*  are close to each other. The effect o f 1 -  F  < 1 -  F* and 
F  (0) > F* will not be offset by the condition between /  (0) and /* (0^. 
As as result, we have and b^ ' > b^*.
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The equilibrium prices, from Figure 3, charged by both firms in their domestic 
markets exceed those charged in foreign markets. That is, bilateral dumping 
occurs.
When product-indifferent consumers in DC have relatively high preferences 
and those in LDC have relatively low preferences, the price differential is high 
in DC and low in LDC. Firm H  faces high competition in LDC and low 
competition in DC. Higher competition and lower preference induce firm H  to 
charge a lower price in LDC than in DC. This also causes firm L to charge a 
lower export price than it does in its national market. Thus, we have bilateral 
dumping. The condition of relatively small 9 and relatively large 6 implies 
that there is a relatively large number of quality sensitive consumers in LDC 
and a relatively large number of quality insensitive consiuners in DC, while 
maintaining the assumption that quality sensitive consumers with lower (higher) 
preferences occur in greater proportion in the LDC (DC). It implies that there
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is higher market share for firm H  in LDC and for firm L  in DC. Therefore, it 
creates incentive for both firms to engage in price dumping.
5 AD Law
At issue is whether the LDC or both countries have an incentive to enact an 
AD law. In considering this enactment, we will suppose that the government’s 
objective is the protection of its constituent duopolist, not the maximization of 
welfare‘s  Thus the focus of our discussion will be the effect of the law upon 
firm profitability. Since, in practice, duties are introduced after the firms interact 
for a period o f time, and remain in place for another period o f time, one approach 
would be to analyze a model of at least 2 periods. Firms would compare the cost 
o f avoiding the duty through strategic modification of their period I behavior 
with the cost o f competing while encumbered by a duty in period 2. We will 
take an alternative approach by black boxing the (hypothetical) second period, 
and assuming that the optimal strategy for a firm is to avoid an affirmative AD 
verdict. A Justification is the bias and arbitrariness in the calculation o f AD 
duties, as well as their frequently high levels'". We will discover, however, 
that in many instances the black box is innocuous, as both firms gain from the 
introduction of AD laws. That is, AD laws induce a strategic modification in
“ Amongst the DCs in which AD complaints are frequently filed, Australia and the U.S. 
do not have a national interest clause in their AD laws. The EC rarely invokes its clause, 
and Canada, to our knowledge, has never done so. Thus we consider it reasonable to ignore 
consumer surplus in the optimization decision of the governments. This is because in practice, 
AD laws are not used as a welfare maximization policy instrument. Alternatively, consumers 
are accorded negligible weight in the government’s objective function.
' ‘'See Boltuck and Litan (1991) for further discussion o f this bias.
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marketing by the duopolists that is to their mutual benefit.
As we indicated in Section 3, the application of AD duties requires a demon­
stration o f material injury and the unfair pricing of exports. We have defined 
injury as occurring when sales take place at marginal cost and have invoked 
an average price comparison to ascertain the existence o f unfair pricing. Both 
existence conditions must be met to be in accord with the AD Code of the 
GATT/WTO. Thus circumventing the AD law of the government for the rival 
firm requires that only one of these existence conditions fail to hold. Since the 
existence o f material injury requires that some sales take place at marginal cost, 
a firm that is vulnerable to an accusation of dumping can avoid culpability by 
ceasing to sell to the quality insensitive consumers in its export market through 
separate distribution channels. In this instance, the firms do not engage in price 
discrimination by selling to the two groups of consumers through different dis­
tribution channels. Rather, they adopt a uniform pricing strategy, where by each 
firm charges the same price to all consumers in a market‘d.
As long as material injury is not manifest, export prices are not constrained 
to be at least as great as national market prices. In the following subsections, 
we will consider the effect of the introduction of an AD law by the government 
o f the country into which the dumping takes place. This consideration parallels 
the propositions that were disclosed previously. We will direct our attention 
primarily to Proposition I. However, it will be demonstrated that both govern­
ments may introduce an AD law, irrespective of the direction(s) o f dumping in
‘^They can, however, be nonuniform across markets.
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free trade '^*.
5.1 Uniform Pricing as a Response to AD Law(s)
When unilateral dumping by the DC duopolist takes place, and the LDC govern­
ment institutes an AD law, the DC duopolist may respond, as indicated above, 
by ceasing to sell in the LDC through separate distribution channels. That is, 
it does not engage in price discrimination in the LDC market. Instead, it will 
charge a uniform price in the LDC. This strategy entails the DC firm ceding 
the quality insensitive consumers in the LDC to its rival, since any effort to 
sell to the consumers that shop only on the basis of price will drive price down 
to marginal cost. Hence the LDC firm becomes a monopolist with respect to 
the quality insensitive consumers in its national market. Furthermore, the DC 
firm will charge a higher price than the LDC firm. This is because the DC firm 
finds, as it does in free trade, that competing for sales to less quality sensitive 
consumers entails too great a sacrifice o f profits on sales to more selective 
consumers.
At issue is whether or not the LDC firm would continue to maintain two 
distribution channels if it were pricing as a monopolist to the insensitive con­
sumers, and its rival utilized a single channel. That is, will it adopt a imiform
‘‘‘A firm can also circumvent an AD law in its expoit market by charging the same weighted 
average price in each market. In this instance, its rival is still injured by sales at marginal 
cost, but there is no unfair pricing. However, it will choose to avoid culpability for material 
injury, because it can choose uniform prices that solves the profit maximization problem in each 
market. This will yield higher profits than when optimization permits the choice o f  one price 
that must be charged to quality sensitive consumers in two markets with differing distributions 
over tastes.
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pricing strategy in which it charges the same price to both quality sensitive and 
insensitive consumers, or will it continue to engage in price discrimination? 
With the former strategy, the price charged to both categories o f  consumers 
is generated by a duopolistic interaction. With the latter strategy, the price it 
charges to the selective consumers is also generated by a duopolistic interaction 
between the firms. The price charged to the quality insensitive consumers is 
the monopoly price derived from their demand function. If the duopoly price 
charged to the selective consumers is below the monopoly price o f the quality 
insensitive consumers, the nonselective consumers will buy through the same 
distribution channel as the selective consumers'^. In this instance, the LDC 
firm will adopt a uniform pricing strategy. We assume this to be the case"'.
Recall that under Proposition I, the DC duopolist unilaterally dumps in 
the LDC. If it circumvents the LDC AD law as indicated above, the LDC 
firm is likely to be charging a lower average price for exports to the DC than 
it charges in its national market. This is underscored by the Proposition's 
requiring relatively similar preferences in the two countries among the selective 
consumers, the relatively large number of quality insensitive consumers in the 
LDC that are paying a higher price under the LDC AD law, and the sales at 
marginal cost in the DC to quality insensitive consumers. Since material injury 
to the DC firm will be manifest because o f the marginal cost pricing, the DC 
government will have an incentive to implement an AD law. That is, bilateral
are supposing that quality insensitive consumers will shop anywhere in order to obtain 
a lower price. However, selective consumers will shop only in selective distribution channels.
'G |f not, the LDC firm will continue to maintain two distribution channels. The equilibrium 
for the selective consumers will be unaffected by the AD law, and the LDC duopolist will earn 
monopoly profits from sales to quality insensitive consumers in its national market.
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introduction o f AD laws arises from the anticipation in the second stage o f the 
concomitant responses o f the duopolists to the introduction o f an AD law by 
the LDC government.
When both governments implement AD laws, the objective function for the 
LDC duopolist in the LDC market is given by
[ ^  (^) +  « -  ^Pu] • (12)
That for the DC duopolist continues to be depicted by (5), upon substituting 
p[l for Pfl. This yields tt//. Equation (12) discloses that the uniform price p^ 
is charged to both categories of consumers in the LDC.
When the DC government introduces an AD law, an analogous issue emerges 
with regard to material injury. The existence o f the separate distribution channel 
for quality insensitive consumers, in which price equals marginal cost, induces 
the LDC firm to jettison this channel and sell at a uniform price to circumvent 
the DC AD law. That is, it does not want to compete with its rival for the quality 
insensitive consumers in the DC and drive price into equality with marginal cost. 
Thus its objective function for the DC becomes
(13)
The DC duopolist will choose to retain a separate distribution channel for 
the unselective consumers in its national market. Doing so will enable it to 
earn positive profits from sales to these consumers, and may enable it to price 
as a monopolist. Hence one implication of the introduction o f AD laws to 
our model is that the foreign firm ceases to compete aggressively for sales to
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quality insensitive consumers, and it is induced to utilize a single distribution 
channel
However, specifying the objective function o f the DC firm for the DC market 
is more complex than the analogous objective of its LDC rival in the LDC. This 
is because the monopoly price derived from </* =  a *  — /i*p* may exceed 
the price the LDC firm charges quality sensitive consumers in the DC. If this is 
the case, quality insensitive consumers will purchase from the same distribution 
channel as their selective counterparts. Because, in the Linder framework, the 
proportion o f consumers that are quality insensitive in the LDC is expected to be 
relatively small, we will suppose that p^’is greater than the price a monopolist 
would charge quality insensitive consumers in the DC *. In this instance, the 
DC firm's objective function for sales to quality sensitive consumers in the DC 
continues to be given by the analogue of (5). Since neither firm sells to quality 
insensitive consumers in its export market, no AD actions are initiated.
The best response functions for the DC duopolist in the two countries, given 
the assumptions in the above discussion, are not affected by the introduction 
o f AD laws. Thus they are given by equation (7) for the LDC market and its 
unstated analogue for the DC market. Differentiating (12) with respect to p^ 
yields the best response functions for the LDC firm in its national market as
‘~Of the two categories o f  consumers, the quality insensitive one are affected the more 
adversely. This is consistent with Clark’s (1982) result that protection is regressive.
i8were this not the case, the DC firm would price as a von Stackelberg leader. In so doing, it 
would set a price in the selective market that captured the optimal trade off in profits generated 
by the two markets in the DC. The DC firm cannot charge a uniform price to both categories 
o f  consumers, as the LDC firm always charges a lower price to selective consumers. With a 
uniform price by the DC firm, it would not sell to the nonselective consumers.
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The best response function for the LDC firm in its export market is also unaf­
fected by the AD laws.
From the best response functions (7), (8), and (14), as well as the monopoly 
profits the DC firm earns from unselective consumers in its national market, 
we can ascertain the effect of the introduction o f the AD laws on equilibrium 
prices in the two countries. That is, we can state that
a —  >
If 6^ > b^, the equilibrium prices charged by both firms must increase in the 
LDC. That is, the best response of the LDC duopolist shifts upward along a 
constant b^' This is disclosed by Figure 4. Because o f the assumption 
of strategic complementarity, both firms earn greater profits from their sales 
to quality sensitive consumers in the LDC. Since both duopolists earn positive 
profits from their sales to the nonselective consumers in their national markets, 
and the equilibrium for the selective consumers in the DC is unalfected, both 
firms gain from the bilateral introduction of AD laws. Even if 6^ =  b^, the firms 
would gain through the introduction o f AD laws because o f the positive profits 
earned from sales to quality indifferent consumers in their national markets.
Figure 4.
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When both firms gain from the introduction of AD laws, we would expect, 
through subgame perfection, that governments would introduce such laws in 
the first stage o f a two-stage game*'-*.
From (14), however, it is apparent that 6  ^ < is a possibility. This results 
in the prices charged to the selective consumers falling relative to free trade. 
This induces a decline in the profits earned by both firms from sales to the 
quality sensitive consumers in the LDC. A reduction in the price charged to the 
quality sensitive consumers is not sufficient to lower the profits accruing to the 
LDC firm, however. This is because the LDC duopolist earns positive profits 
from sales to the quality insensitive consumers when an AD law is introduced. 
Since zero profits accrue from sales to the unselective consumers in free trade, 
the LDC gains from an AD law in the LDC as long as
‘^Recall, in this regard, that protection o f  its constituent duopolist, not the maximization o f 
welfare, is assumed to be the objective o f  each government.
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( a - f i p ^ y p l l > p j l F { ê ) - p ^ F ( ê a ) ,  (16)
where Ôj denotes the quality sensitive indifferent consumers (recall equations
(2)) in the LDC when an AD law is implemented in that country.
When the prices charged to selective consumers fall with the implementation 
of an AD law in the LDC. the strategic interplay between governments becomes 
more complex. Continuing with the example o f unilateral price dumping by 
the DC duopolist as in Proposition 1, the LDC government will not introduce 
an AD law if the left side of (16) is less than the right side. In that instance, 
neither country will introduce an AD law.
Suppose, however, that the left side o f (16) exceeds that right side. The 
LDC government will introduce an AD law in stage one o f  the game. The 
DC government will also introduce a law, because its constituent duopolist will 
generate profitable sales to quality insensitive consumers in its national market. 
Once again, bilateral introduction o f AD laws obtains. However, the DC firm 
may or may not gain relative to free trade. Its profits from exports to selective 
consumers in the LDC decline, but it earns positive profits from sales to quality 
insensitive consumers in the DC. Nonetheless, because o f the latter, it gains 
relative to the unilateral introduction of an AD law by the LDC government.
As the above discussion discloses, unilateral dumping by the LDC duopolist 
can result in either bilateral introduction or nonintroduction o f AD laws by both 
governments. Similar reasoning applied to Proposition 2 permits the conclu­
sion that bilateral introduction and nonintroduction are possible. If the right
3 0
side o f (16) exceeds the left, unilateral introduction by the home government 
will transpire. That is, the DC duopolist gains from the positive profits aris­
ing from sales to nonselective consumers in its national market when the law 
is introduced. However, the LDC government will not enact an AD law be­
cause its constituent firm's profits are reduced. When bilateral dumping takes 
place, as delineated in Proposition 3, bilateral AD laws, bilateral nonintroduc­
tion, or unilateral introduction by the DC government are plausible equilibrium 
strategies.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a warning that the recent trend of the introduction o f AD 
laws by LDC governments may continue to undermine the success o f the 
GATT/WTO in lowering tariffs. It does so through reliance on the Linder 
model to explain trade between a LDC and a DC. Although, in practice, the 
DCs have a first mover advantage in the introduction of AD laws, the model 
provides a sufficiently strong basis for bilateral AD laws that policy makers 
have a justification for seeking to curtail their proliferation.
As we noted in the introduction, the LDCs that are ranked in the top 10 
invokers o f  AD complaints are South Africa, Argentina, South Korea, India, and 
Brazil. These may be classified as being among the relatively advanced LDCs 
or as new industrialized countries (NICs). This suggests that the values o f  ê 
and 0 may be reasonably close, when this phenomena is viewed in the context 
o f our model. That is, the selective consumers in the DC may have only a
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slightly stronger preference for quality than those in an NIC. Thus Propositions 
1 and 2 may be the more pertinent depictions of the trading countries that are 
invoking AD actions against one another.
3 2
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Chapter 2
Inflation and Credibility of 
Monetary Policy: The Case of 
Inflation Targeting
35
1 Introduction
Credibility has become an important issue in setting monetary policy. The 
reason is that credibility can dramatically increase the effectiveness of the policy, 
especially when the policymaker focuses on disinflationary policy. If the public 
believes in the commitment o f the policymaker to achieve low inflation, its 
expectation o f future inflation would decrease and would not be much affected 
by a temporary shock to actual inflation. Therefore, a credible policy can 
affect inflation more effectively than one with less credibility in response to a 
temporary shock. As a result, a credible policy can help mitigate the costs or 
adverse effects that accompany a disinflationary policy.
To enhance credibility of the monetary policy and so to achieve and maintain 
price stability, several countries have adopted inflation targeting as their policy 
frameworks. The plots of actual inflation for targeting countries show that 
inflation fell afler inflation targets were first announced. However, some other 
countries, such as Germany, have pursued low inflation or price stability for 
decades without explicit inflation targets and the plots o f actual inflation for 
these countries also indicate declines in inflation since 1990. If decrease in 
inflation is a global phenomenon, then the question is how policymakers should 
conduct their policies. In other words, is it necessary to announce an explicit 
target to convince the public? To answer this question, 1 derive the measure o f 
credibility to evaluate the change of policy.
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The goal o f this chapter is to shed some light on the following issues: how the 
credibility of the policy varied with the adoption o f inflation targeting, whether 
the credibility was enhanced by only emphasizing on price stability without 
explicit targets, or how the credibility evolved over time among countries. Since 
credibility is unobservable and thus is difficult to quantify, the existing empirical 
literature has either used indirect measurement through the market response o f 
commodity prices or the market response o f exchange rates, such as Hardouvelis 
and Barnhart (1989) and Amano, Fenton, Tessier and van Norden (1997), or 
used survey data as proxy, such as Johnson (1998). Moreover, Weber (1992), 
Baxter (1985), and Ruge-Murcia (1995) have used the probability that changes 
in policy had occurred as the measurement of credibility. The results o f these 
studies are mixed.
Different from previous literature, this study is among the first to directly 
quantify credibility as well as the policymaker's intention. Based on a theo­
retical model o f inflation and credibility, credibility is quantified in terms of 
the difference between the public's expectation of actual inflation and the pol­
icy inflation. Without restrictions on any rules or discretion, the flexibility o f 
the empirical implementation gives us a better way to deal with the situation in 
which the policymakers are willing to reduce inflation and to achieve the goal o f 
price stability with or without the announcement. Therefore, the implementation 
o f this chapter is more general in viewing credibility as the main thrust behind 
disinflation in coimtries with or without explicit inflation targets. Further, the 
policymaker's intention is hard to observe even under the announcement o f the 
policy. The estimation in this study is one way to measure the policymaker’s
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intention and possibly offer a better way to the use o f survey data.
Assume that people are rational and they use all available information in­
cluding the track record o f policy to form their expectation. Further assume that 
there exists asymmetric information between the public and the policymaker. 
Through the technique of a state space representation and Kalman filter. I am 
able to draw explicit inferences about the evolution o f credibility as well as 
the unobservable policy inflation. The empirical estimation is applied to three 
countries with inflation targeting regimes, namely Canada, the United Kingdom 
and Sweden, and, for comparison, to countries without explicitly announced 
targets, namely Germany and the United States. The sample period covers Jan­
uary 1970 to June 1997, before and after the introduction of inflation targeting 
regime. Our results reveal that the credibility has been improved over time.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes the key motivation and 
features o f inflation targeting regime. Recent inflation performance is briefly 
discussed. Section 3 briefly reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Section 4 lays out the basic theoretical model based on the model introduced 
in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). Section 5 outlines the empirical model 
while Section 6 provides the data analysis and the empirical results. Section 7 
concludes.
2 Price Stability and Inflation Targeting
During the mid-1980s and 1990s, the United States and other major industrial­
ized countries started to experience disinflation. In addition, since the beginning
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of the 1990s, the inflation rate has declined dramatically throughout the indus­
trial world. Many countries have come to recognize this trend of reducing 
inflation, and as a result are willing to regain price stability as a long-term 
primary goal for monetary policy-".
Both theoretical and practical findings have encouraged countries to pur­
sue price stability as the primary goal for monetary policy. For instance, the 
view that inflation entails economic and social costs for the society is widely 
accepted-\ One major cost, for example, is that higher inflation creates greater 
uncertainty about future inflation and relative prices. Due to the costs o f infla­
tion, at higher level, inflation will decrease the growth rate o f economy. On the 
other hand, studies have found that lower rate o f inflation will not only create 
a higher output but also higher growth rate^-. In addition, price stability can 
promote economic efficiency and so as to raise the society's living standards. 
Further, it is also widely agreed that there is no long-term tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment, so that monetary policy only affects price level 
in the long run. Finally, the uncertainty of the effects o f monetary policy on 
economy also indicates that pursuing price stability should be the long-run goal 
for monetary policy.
*°For example, the Reserve Bank o f  New Zealand Act o f  1989 states that the sole macroeco­
nomic objective is to achieve and maintain “stability o f  the general level o f prices.” Moreover, 
since the I980’s the primary goals o f monetary policy in the United Kingdom and for the Bank 
of Canada have been to attain price stability and to improve the credibility o f monetary policy. 
In the United States, several Congressman and Federal Reserve officials have endorsed the 
concept o f price stability as the principle policy objective for the Federal Reserve. See also 
Crow (1988) and Fisher (1996) for more information.
‘ ‘Detail discussion can be found in Fisher (1981), Fisher (1996) and Mishkin and Posen 
(1997).
^^See, for example, fisher (1993), Barro (1995) and Brunoand Easterly (1995).
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As a result, to achieve and maintain price stability, some countries, such as 
Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom in our samples, have adopted inflation 
targeting as their policy frameworks by specifying explicit targets within a 
particular time frame. The other countries, such as Germany, have specified 
implicit inflation targets. Finally, countries such as the United States have taken 
actions to acquire and maintain credibility for low inflation, even though price 
stability has never been mandated by Congress.
2.1 Inflation Targeting
In this paper, one objective is to evaluate the strategy of inflation targeting. A 
brief discussion on this strategy is provided here*^. There has been long debate 
among economists on whether monetary policies should be conducted as strate­
gies o f “rules” or “discretion.” While both rules and discretion have their own 
extreme benefits and shortcomings, inflation targeting has been characterized as 
“constrained discretion” by Bemanke and Mishkin (1997), and as an alternative 
in between.
On one hand, inflation targeting can benefit from and also be harmed by 
its rule-like characteristics. The announcement of explicit numerical targets for 
inflation provides a clear and consistent guidance for monetary policy. It can 
be easily understood and monitored by the public and thus will reduce some 
uncertainty about future inflation. However, concentrating on numerical targets
‘^ ^Leiderman and Svensson (1995), VfcCallum (1996), Bemanke and Mishkin (1997), 
Latrance ( 1997), Mishkin and Posen ( 1997) and Kahn and Parrish ( 1998), among others, present 
detailed analyses o f  experiences on adopting inflation targeting.
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places some constraints on the policymaker's action, and therefore reduces a 
certain level o f llexibility o f the policy to respond to some economic situations.
On the other hand, inflation targeting also has pros and cons o f discretion. 
There would not be rigid rules imposed for the monetary policy; instead, the 
policy can be readjusted to cope with supply shocks and to respond to current 
conditions, such as exchange rates or other short-run developments. By doing 
so, however, it will reduce some degree o f credibility. Nonetheless, in contrast 
to pure discretion, inflation targeting might be able to convince the public that 
a departure from targets due to a supply shock is only a temporary phenomenon 
and inflation will gradually move back to targets.
Due to the fact that inflation targeting shares advantages and disadvantages 
o f rules and discretion, the key challenge for the policymaker has been the 
ability to balance in between and thus to achieve the best performance, since 
the tighter the constraint on the policy, the easier for the public to understand 
and monitor, but also the less flexibility to respond to current conditions.
The following is a brief discussion on features o f this regime. One important 
feature which allows flexibility in the monetary policy to account for shocks and 
uncertainty is to set targets as a range or tolerance interval. Second, because of 
an upward bias in measuring inflation, target is designed slightly above zero, as 
suggested by Fisher (1996) at about 2 percent within a range o f I to 3 percent 
per year. Third, the setup allows a transition path to gradually bring down the 
inflation and also allows the targets to vary over time. Fourth, each country 
may have its “underlying” price index based on consumer price index (CPI) 
to exclude the effects o f supply shocks. Finally, some countries also provide
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“escape clauses" for modification in case of certain circumstances. Overall, 
the important roles of inflation targeting are to provide a nominal anchor for 
monetary policy and to promote credibility to monetary policy.
2.2 Inflation Performance
Since there are relatively few years of data after the inflation targeting has 
taken place, we use monthly data for better results. This paper focuses on three 
countries that have adopted inflation targeting regimes — Canada, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom-^. They are among the first to announce explicit inflation 
targets and share the most common features mentioned above, disregarding 
some variety o f  institutional procedures.
In February 1991, the Bank o f Canada and the Government of Canada jointly 
announced explicit targets for reducing inflation. The 12-month rate o f change 
in the overall CPI was to be kept within a range o f ±  1% with a midpoint o f 
3% by the end o f  1992, 2.5% by mid-1994, and 2% by the end of 1995. This 
target range o f 1 to 3% has been extended to the end o f 2001.
The motivation for the United Kingdom to adopt inflation targeting regime 
is a departure from the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System (EMS). In October 1992, the Chancellor o f the Exchequer announced 
the explicit targets. The targets are defined in terms of the 12-month increase 
in the retail prices index, excluding mortgage interest payments (PRIX), and 
are initially set at 1 to 4%. The current target is to achieve a point target o f
summary o f  inflation targeting frameworks for nine countries can be found in Kahn and 
Parrish (1998).
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underlying inflation (measured by PRIX) o f 2.5%.
As with the United Kingdom, due to the collapse o f a fixed exchange rate, the 
Riksbank's Governing Board in Sweden annoimced explicit inflation targeting as 
the new anchor in January 1993. The objective is defined in terms o f achieving 
12-month changes o f the “headline” CPI o f  2%, with a tolerance interval o f ±  
1% point, for 1995 and on.
As a comparison, we also examine one implicit inflation targeting country, 
Germany, and one without any specified targeting regime but only focusing on 
low inflation, the United States.
Figures 1.1 through 1.5 demonstrate five countries' inflation behavior for the 
period from January 1970 to June 1997. The vertical lines represent the an­
nouncement of inflation targeting for Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden, 
and the announcement o f monetary targeting for Germany, respectively.
In general, we can divide these series into three subperiods. First, I970’s 
to early I980’s represents a period o f high and volatile inflation caused by 
oil price shocks. Second, from early I980’s to early 1990’s, all countries 
started to experience disinflation, during which inflation in Canada and the 
United Kingdom was relatively stable and inflation in Germany experienced a 
deep downward trend with negative inflation performance. Third, early I990’s 
and on is a period o f  low and, in some cases, stable inflation. For inflation 
targeting countries, due to the realization o f the importance of price stability, 
inflation performance has dramatically improved and declined from the 6% to 
12% range around 1990 to less than 3% in 1997. On the other hand, even 
without the announcement o f targets, focusing on low inflation has brought the
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United States a stable and low, in a range o f 2.5% to 3.4%, inflation period. 
Overall, Germany has the most outstanding and stable inflation performance 
during the whole sample period, owing to its good track record.
Questions emerge, therefore, as to how the announcement affects inflation 
expectation and thus credibility of the policy, and whether the policymakers 
have kept their commitment to price stability.
3 The Literature
3.1 Theory of Monetary Policy and Credibility
Recent literature on inflation, credibility and reputation emphasize a game- 
theoretical framework. It characterizes the determination of inflation and output 
as a game between the policymaker and private-sector agents. Barro and Gordon 
(1983b) augment the example introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977) to 
include a theory o f expectations formation. In their framework, the public 
forms expectation rationally and the policymaker optimizes, in each period, 
subject to the public’s expectation.
Barro and Gordon (1983a) extend this line o f framework to allow for repu­
tational forces. If the game between the policymaker and the public is repeated 
infinite times, it is possible for the government to establish reputational forces 
to support the monetary rules. However, there are shortcomings in this type o f 
framework. One is that the “punishment” strategy played by the public is arbi­
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trary. Moreover, in this infinite horizon game, the equilibrium is not unique. To 
account for this. Backus and Driffiii (1985) and Barro (1986) extend previous 
works of Barro and Gordon to consider asymmetric information between the 
policymaker and the public: the public is uncertain about the policymaker's type 
or preference. Thus, the reputation can be defined as a probability assigned by 
the public that the policymaker is pursuing a zero-inflation policy. One impor­
tant feature o f this type of framework is that government policy is dynamically 
consistent. However, as stressed by Backus and Driiïill (1985) themselves and 
by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), one shortcoming in their framework is that 
there are only two types o f policymaker, such as zero-inflation and inflationary, 
and they never change. Once the government’s type is revealed, asymmetric 
information does not exist anymore.
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) overcome this problem by allowing gov­
ernment objectives to change continuously overtime and also have an infinite 
number o f values. One of the features o f their model is that under asymmetric 
information it is possible to show that the discretionary-consistent solution is 
the same as the optimal solution. Furthermore, due to the persistence in the pol­
icymaker’s objective and imperfect monetary control, expectation is influenced 
by past monetary growth. Also, they are able to parameterize credibility as a 
continuous variable. Finally, monetary policy in this model is also dynamically 
consistent.
3.2 Empirical Measurement of Credibility
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To quantify the Federal Reserve’s credibility, Hardouvelis and Barnhart (1989) 
measure credibility as the response o f commodity prices as well as the response 
o f six-month T-bill yields to unanticipated change in M l. The response param­
eters are estimated as time-varying coefficients o f Kalman filter. The results 
show that the announced policies in both October 1979 and October 1982 did 
not result in any immediate change in credibility. In addition, without prior 
knowledge of the announcement o f changes in policy, it is difficult to identify 
changes in credibility. There even exists opposite direction in the market re­
sponse from what one would expect based on the announcement. The opposite 
response between commodity prices and interest rates also indicates that one 
could not distinguish whether changes o f response are due to changes in the in­
formative content o f  an Ml announcement, or due to changes in credibility. As 
a result, we cannot draw a solid conclusion about the credibility o f the Federal 
Reserve from their results.
Johnson (1998) uses survey data o f one-year ahead inflation forecast as a 
proxy for expectation o f inflation to assess the credibility and success o f mon­
etary policy in 18 countries with and without inflation targeting between 1984 
and 1995. For countries with targets, the direct measure o f credibility is the 
difference between forecasts and the midpoints o f the bands o f the inflation 
targets. For all 18 countries the alternative approach is using forecast errors. 
The results are mixed and show that it was difficult to establish credible infla­
tion targets. Since reduction in the variance o f forecast errors is the common 
phenomenon among all countries with and without targets, we cannot define 
the contribution o f targets or conclude that targets have been successful.
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There is one other line o f measuring credibility or reputation. Following 
the theoretical framework o f Backus and DritTill (1985), Weber (1992) mea­
sures reputation as the probability o f policy switching between two states of 
policy, anti-inflationary and inflationary. The empirical test is applied to the 
original European Monetary System (EMS) member countries and a group of 
non-EMS countries for the first quarter period o f 1960 to the fourth quarter 
o f 1990. Similarly, Baxter (1985) and Ruge-Murcia (1995) define credibility 
as the probability that the policymaker or the joint observation of variables is 
pursuing a reformed policy regime. Through the implication o f sustainable and 
compatible fiscal policy, Baxter estimates the credibility of the Chilean and Ar­
gentine exchange reforms in the late 1970's. On the other hand, the credibility 
o f stabilization programs of Israel was measured in a model o f government 
expenditure for the period January 1982 to December 1987 by Ruge-Murcia 
(1995). However, Weber, Baxter and Ruge-Murcia share the common feature 
that the Bayesian updating properties are employed into the estimation proce­
dures in the model of Markov regime switching and Kalman filter.
To assess the adoption o f inflation targeting in Canada, Amano, Fenton, 
Tessier and van Norden (1997) test the credibility o f this change in monetary 
policy using a “news” approach based on the asset market view of exchange 
rate determination. Their results show that there does exist a change in the 
monetary policy regime in Canada relative to the United States from 1988 to 
1992, and that this change in monetary policy in Canada has been credible.
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4 The Theoretical Model
One of the results obtained by the previous research in monetary policy is that a 
binding rule o f zero inflation is feasible to achieve low inflation and is superior 
to the discretion in policy. However, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) develop 
a model o f inflation under asymmetric information in which the policymaker 
has informational advantage o f his objective over the public when choosing the 
rate o f money growth. As a result, the zero-inflation rule might not be the 
better solution for the policymaker than the discretionary policy. Thereby, the 
policymaker should not be bound by any rule and should follow the policy that 
is feasible under the condition of economy. As far as inflation targeting regime 
is concerned, it is designed to respond to conditions of economy on some level.
The goal o f this study is to derive inference o f inflation performance and the 
underlying credibility. A natiwal rate model o f Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) is 
introduced into the model o f Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) in substitution of 
the use o f money growth. In addition, the policymaker's objective function is 
a function of social welfare rather than the policymaker's political preferences. 
In other words, the policymaker maximizes an objective that reflects society's 
preferences on inflation and output. Nonetheless, the model presented here is 
not much different from the one in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986).
The general structure o f this model is formed as a game imder asymmetric 
information between the policymaker and the public. In general, policymakers 
have an informational advantage about their objectives. In particular, they 
know the state where the preference is in, but the public does not know this
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with certainty. The game goes as follows. First, the public forms a rational 
expectation about period t inflation rate using the past information up to and 
including t-1. Policymakers know the process by which the public forms its
expectation. Thus, in period t, policymakers choose their policy inflation rate
to optimize the objective function using all available information including 
knowledge of the current random shock and the public’s expectation.
The stylized model is as follows:
</( =  i/f" +  -  O  (17)
TTt =  7rf +  ej (18)
nuLX
t ’^1 ' (=u L
(19)
St = S  + i'll (20)
Qt = pi'it-i + ut (21)
= {I — p)if^ + {p — X) TTt-i (22)
7rf =  (5i7fP +  02^1 (23)
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Q =  Kf — Tif 1 (24)
Equation (17) is an aggregate supply function in which the difference between 
output ijt and the natural rate y" is created by unexpected inflation (ttj — ttJ"). 
7rf is the public’s rational expectation o f current inflation rate, or Trf =  E i- itti 
where E i^i is a mathematical conditional expectation and denotes expectations 
under the realization of all variables up to and including period t-1.
Equation (18) states the policymaker’s imperfect control over inflation. De­
viation o f actual inflation ttj from the policymaker’s policy inflation rate is 
determined by a stochastic control error st with zero mean and variance (t'^ . 
Policy inflation, 7rf, reflects one aspect of the policymaker’s intention. If the 
policymaker’s intention is to promote output rather than to control inflation, we 
shall observe higher level of 7rf, and vice versa. Imperfect control may come 
from the imperfect foresight o f the current or future economic event, since 
in this model the policymaker does not possess superior knowledge about the 
economic conditions.
Equation (19) states the policymaker’s multi-period and state-contingent ob­
jective function reflecting social welfare. In period 0, the policymaker chooses 
a sequence o f current and future policy inflation rate {7r f} to maximize dis­
counted expected social welfare with a discount factor l3 and 0 < (3 < 1.
Equations (20) and (21) together describe the stochastic character o f the 
policymaker’s preference. The parameter St is the relative weight o f output to 
inflation under the policymaker’s objectives. When St changes, it reveals policy
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shifts between output stimulation and inflation control. If =  0, it shows that 
the policymaker cares only about inflation and thus chooses zero inflation policy. 
If St 7^  0, the policymaker’s preference concerns both output and inflation. Tlie 
larger the St, the more likely the policymaker is to increase output disregarding 
inflation. By assumption, St is only known to the policymaker but not to the 
public. S  represents the average relative preference o f the policymaker for 
output. Further, ilt is a time-varying stochastic parameter which contributes 
persistence in the policymaker’s preference in which ut is a disturbance term 
with zero mean and variance «rj; .
Equation (22) is the resulting one-period expectation o f the public. Expected 
inflation is a weighted average o f the mean policy inflation, and last period 
rate of actual inflation, with weights (1 -  p)ai\d {p -  A), is interpreted as 
the public’s preconceptions on policy. Under rational expectation, equation (23) 
states that policy inflation contains two parts: the fixed policy mean as well as 
persistence o f policy, p, A.6 | and ào are known parameters. Following Faust 
and Svensson (1998), we interpret A as the policymaker’s persistence of shift 
between preference.
Finally, credibility, ct, is defined as the absolute value o f the difference 
between the public’s expected actual inflation rate, 7r^ , and the policy rate, 7rf. 
The bigger the difference, the lower the credibility o f the policy, and vice versa.
5 The Empirical Implementation
The empirical framework in this section is based on the implications o f section 4.
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For the public to believe the announcement o f a change in the monetary policy, 
the policymaker needs to show the ability o f maintaining that announcement 
as well as establishing a good track record. In the case of disinflationary 
policy, if the policymaker has consistently pursued a tightened policy and has 
kept inflation down, the public will learn that a low-inflation policy is really 
prevailing. As a result, credibility of the policy will increase.
Since credibility depends on perception o f the public and can not be ob­
served directly, it is difficult to quantify. One way to measure it is through 
the implication of the observed time series behavior under rational-expectation 
hypothesis. Assume that the "rational” public uses the past track record o f the 
policy and all available information to form an expectation o f future policy. 
By using observed variables and realized past values o f unobserved variables, 1 
am able to draw explicit inferences about the unobserved variables through the 
application o f a state space representation and Kalman filter. Using the algo­
rithm of sequentially updating a linear projection, I can then obtain a maximiun 
likelihood estimation*'^.
In order to implement the empirical model, first, define the actual inflation 
as the sum o f the expected inflation and the forecast error, such that
IXt =  7Tj -h (25)
where rj is a white noise disturbance term with zero mean and variance rrjf 
by the assumption of rational expectation. Also, to obtain an estimation of
‘^ ^Formal descrption and application o f Kalman filter in economics can be found in Burmeister 
and Wall (1982), Hamilton (1985), Burmeister, Wall and Hamilton (1986), Harvey (1989), and 
Hamilton (1994 a,b).
52
credibility, redefine credibility in equation (24) as
('t = 7Tt - u f ,  (26)
an index of credibility. In this case, when q  is greater than zero, the policy is 
not credible. If èt is equal to zero, the policy is fully credible and the public 
also believes in policymaker’s ability to control the external shocks. If q  is 
less than zero, the public not only expects a disinflation, but also believes that 
any deviation of inflation from planned inflation will be easily eliminated by 
the policymaker.
To distinguish between policies with and without targets, 1 make a further 
interpretation. When there is an explicitly announced target with inflation tar­
geting regime, an increase in c, represents less belief o f the public in these 
targets. On the other hand, if there is no explicit inflation target, then a large 
c't shows that the public does not view the policymaker as an inflation fighter; 
instead, they believe that an inflationary policy is taking place. Overall, the 
larger q  is, the less credible for the policy to be disinflationary.
In the setting o f credibility, 1 use expected actual inflation rather than ex­
pected policy rate which is used in other studies, simply because the public 
can not directly observe the policymaker’s policy rate and can only observe 
the actual rate^ '^. It is through this definition that asymmetric information be-
'^ ‘'Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) define credibility as the absolute value o f the difference 
between the policymaker’s plans and the public’s beliefs about those plans. On the other hand, 
credibility is defined as negatively related to the distance between the private sector’s inflation 
expectation and the bank’s announced inflation target in Faust and Svensson (1998), such that 
c-t = -  in terms o f our notation. The difference between the definitions in Faust and 
Svensoon and our model is that the zero inflation rate is announced in theirs while the policy
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tween the policymaker and the public plays the role o f regulation, since only 
the policymaker can observe its intention on policy. Furthermore, in this model, 
policy inflation along with credibility index are two unobservable variables and 
their estimation is obtained through Kalman filter. Estimating policy inflation 
as an unobserved variable gives us consistent and generalized results for all 
countries in our sample. As described in section 2, countries having adopted 
inflation targeting use different "underlying" CPI figures as target variables and 
different target ranges. Therefore, using individual target variables as the policy 
inflation may not be suitable for comparison. Moreover, it is also consistent 
with the countries without explicitly announced targets where the policy rate 
is unavailable. Since policy rate can not be observed by the public, inference 
o f the policy inflation through this model represents the best guess about the 
policymaker’s intention.
Combining equations (25) and (26) yields
=  7t{' +  Q +  f*£. (27)
Actual inflation is the combination o f policy rate, credibility index, and forecast 
error, ct and et together can also represent the control error in equation ( 18), 
because both o f them are not controllable by the policymaker. When the poli­
cymaker has perfect control on inflation, both ct and cj are zero, actual inflation 
should follow the policy rate. In this case, if the policymaker’s intention is to 
keep inflation down, actual inflation should reflect this intention regardless o f 
whether the policy is announced or not. On the other hand, when the policy-
rate in our model needs not to be explicitly announced and needs not to be zero.
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maker cannot control inflation perfectly, actual inflation not only depends on its 
intention but also on the public’s belief of the policy and expectation o f infla­
tion. Actual inflation will go up when the policy is not credible, even though 
the policymaker may have announced a zero-inflation policy. In addition, if the 
public believes that a disinflationary policy is taken place, actual inflation will 
decrease even when the policymaker’s revealed intention is not to control the 
inflation.
Equation (22) indicates that the public forms expectations under its precon­
ceptions on policy as well as past information o f actual inflation. Notice that
the policy rate can not be observed by the public. One way for the public to
form preconceptions o f policy may depend on its evaluation o f the credibility
of this policy. In this case, we use last-period credibility index as the public’s 
preconception. Rewrite (22), we have
<  = +/i'27rt_i. (28)
where 0x =  ^ ~ p and (.i> = p — X. To complete the implementation, I employ 
the past value of policy rate to represent the persistence of policy. Rewriting 
(23) gives us
ïïf =  ô i C i - x  4- (527if_i -t- Vi .  (29)
Combining (26), (28) and (29) yields
Q =  7 iQ_i 4- 727rf_i 4- 73^t-i +  m, (30)
where 71 =  /?i -  <5i, 72 =  -62, 73 =  fh and pt =
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Equation (29) states that the policy inflation rate is influenced by its past 
value as well as past credibility index. Under the inflation targeting regime, 
there exists a transition path to gradually bring down the inflation. Also, the 
policymaker takes the public's reaction into account when she/he sets up the 
targets. Thus, it is reasonable that the policy rate depends on its past value and 
credibility index. Equation (30) describes the persistent nature o f credibility. 
Due to the inability for the public to perfectly distinguish between persistent and 
transitory shifts in the policy, credibility can be persistent over time and hence 
is affected by its past value. Further, when the public evaluates the policy, the 
rational public will use all information available, such as observed past policy 
rate and past inflation. Therefore, the last-period policy rate and the last-period 
inflation are included in (30) to measure the credibility.
Combining equations (27), (29) and (30) gives us a state space representation 
which links the observed variables to the unobserved ones.
ijt =  Z a t + IV t, t = l -,T (31)
at = T a t- i  +  Rdt + i]t, (32)
where
d£ =  [7Tt_i]', wt = [et]',
It = [ t’t fJ-t ] , Z =  [ 1 1 I , T  = 62 61 
72 7i
^  =  [ 0  7 3  ] ,
5 6
E {wt) =  0, E{wtw[) =  H, E (//t) = 0 ,  E {ritrfi) =  Q,
H =
Equation (31) Is the measurement equation and it relates the observed variable 
\jt to the state vector at via the evolution of equation (32) which incorporates 
all the useful past information for predicting and updating for the future.
By the assumption o f normal distribution o f the disturbances and initial state 
vector, the filter starts a recursive procedure from an initialized state vector. In 
particular, starting from an initial state vector and covariance matrix, the filter 
obtains the optimal estimation o f the state vector at by continuously updating 
the last period's state vector and covariance matrix as new observations o f  ijt 
become available. The updating procedure is based on
+  Rdt +  I\t {^ yt — Zât^t-i^j , 
K t= T P tit- iZ '{ Z P t^ t- iZ ' + H y \
Pt+i\t = TPt\t-\T' — h t Z P [|£-i T' +  Q,
where ât|(_i denotes the optimal estimator o f a t given ât_ i and Pf_i, Pt|t_i 
denotes the 2 x 2 covariance matrix o f the estimation error, and thus ât+i|t and 
Pt+1|£ are the forecasts of ât+i and Pt+i conditional on â t and p .  Therefore, 
the optimal estimation can be done through a maximum likelihood estimation 
where the likelihood (unction is given as
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"T TL 1 _ ^  _ I I
l o g L  =  ——  log  ( 27t) -  -  ^ l o g  ZPt|£_i Z ' + / /  ( 3 3 )
“ 2 j _ j
— 2 -  Zâ(|£_i  ^ {ZPt\t-\.Z' [jjt — Zàt\t-\^
where n  =  1 in our model.
6 The Results
To obtain a more generalized result o f the policy’s impact on the economy, 
to capture the overall performance o f inflation, as well as for comparisons 
between countries, the CPI index numbers are used to construct each country’s 
actual inflation rather than the “underlying” inflation as target variables. Actual 
inflation calculated as monthly percentage changes in the CPI index are taken 
from International Financial Statistics, IMF. The sample period covers January 
1970 through June 1997.
The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters and log likelihood 
value are reported in Table I, using the method of numerical optimization as 
described in Hamilton (1994). The result shows that estimated parameters o f <5i, 
7 i. 1-1, and 73 are significantly different from zero in Canada. Both the last- 
period policy inflation and the last-period credibility index have positive effects 
on the current policy inflation as well as on the current credibility index, while 
the last-period inflation has a negative influence on the current credibility index. 
In the United Kingdom, the last-period credibility index has a significantly 
positive influence on both the current policy rate and the current credibility
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index. On the other hand, the last-period policy inflation has explanatory power 
only on the current policy rate but the current credibility index. In Sweden, 
all the coefficients are significant except 72. It indicates that the last-period 
credibility index and the last-period inflation have positive explanatory power 
and the last-period policy rate has eflect only on the current policy rate. In 
Germany, only 61 and 71 are significantly positive which shows that only the 
last-period credibility index has influence on dependent variables. In the United 
States, only is not significant. It shows that the last-period policy rate 
has a significantly positive eflect while the last-period inflation has a negative 
effect, and the last-period policy inflation has an influence only on the current 
credibility index.
Standard deviation, cr^ i, is significant in Canada, Germany, and the United 
States. <7;. is significant only in Canada and rr„ is significant only in the United 
Kingdom and Germany. It is evident that the credibility equation carries the 
most statistically significant source of fluctuation for most o f the countries.
Figures 2.1 through 2.5 display inferences about policy inflation and credibil­
ity for Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States, 
respectively. The top panel o f  each figure plots the evolution o f policy inflation 
for each country. Overall, the policymaker of Germany shows the most concern 
for inflation than other countries’ policymakers, and maintains the lowest and 
most stable policy inflation throughout the sample period. On the other hand, 
over the period from 1970 to 1982, it is evident that low inflation or price 
stability is not the center o f the policy for other countries. As a result, policy 
inflation was at a high level, especially for the United Kingdom whose policy
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inflation was not only high, around 5 to 10, but also unstable. In mid-1981, 
disinflationary policy took place in the United States, Canada and the United 
Kingdom. After late 1981, the United States started to reduce the policy infla­
tion and kept it steady in a range of 2 to 2.5. High policy rates o f Canada and 
the United Kingdom were reduced to a range o f 3 to 4 in 1983, but are still 
at a high level. For both countries, until late 1992, policy inflation was further 
decreased and maintained at a range o f 0 to 1.5. In contrast, policy inflation 
was kept high in Sweden through the period from 1970 to early 1990’s, and 
only reduced after early 1992. The plots o f policy inflation for all countries 
show that after 1991 the policymakers became more concerned about maintain­
ing low inflation as their policy. This is also consistent with the realization o f 
price stability as the goal for monetary policy.
The bottom panel o f Figures 2.1 through 2.5 demonstrates the evolution o f 
credibility o f the monetary policy for each country. Again, owing to its good 
track record and its low policy inflation, credibility of the policy in Germany was 
high over the sample period, especially after late 1982, which is indicated by the 
relative low value of credibility index. However, due to the uncertainty resulting 
from the German reunification, credibility was slightly lower during the period 
o f late 1990 to late 1993. On the other hand, focusing on output stimulation 
rather than on controlling inflation gives all other countries the higher value o f 
credibility index which indicates lower credibility from mid 1972 to late 1982. 
After 1982, owing to the disinflationary policy, the United States, Canada and 
the United Kingdom started to establish their credibility. Mid 1983 and 1986 
are the two most credible periods. Clearly, since late 1991, it has been a high
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credibility era for the United States. In Canada, since late 1991, credibility 
was achieved and maintained at a very high level, even higher than those of 
Germany and the United States. The United Kingdom also regained credibility, 
but it was lower in comparison with all other countries. Not until early 1992 
had Sweden established high credibility. Overall, the evidence shows that since 
late 1991 the public has started to believe in disinflationary policy and inflation 
targeting policy, and hence that credibility has been established and maintained 
for all countries in our sample.
Since the credibility index of each country was close to zero after 1991, 
to make further and clearer comparisons between countries, we calculate the 
means and variances of the credibility index for all countries. These are re­
ported in Table 2. They are calculated for three subperiods — January 1970 
to December 1980, January 1981 to December 1989, and January 1990 to June 
1997, and for the whole sample period, January 1970 to June 1997. Among all 
countries the credibility index o f Germany has the lowest value for the first and 
second subperiods. It indicates that the average credibility in Germany was the 
highest for these periods. In contrast, the highest value of the credibility index 
shows that the average credibility in the United Kingdom was the lowest among 
all countries for these periods. The second, third, and fourth highest was the 
United States, Sweden, and Canada, respectively. For all countries the credi­
bility of the first subperiod is lower than that o f the second subperiod. Most 
interestingly, Canada has built up the highest credibility among all countries 
during the third subperiod where the inflation targeting has taken place. On the 
other hand, resulting from German “monetary unification," average credibility
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in Germany was lower than that in the United States and even than that in Swe­
den. Average credibility in the United Kingdom was still the lowest. Through 
three subperiods, it is clear that average credibility for all countries, except for 
Germany, has been gradually improved overtime. Finally, for the whole period, 
average credibility in Germany maintained the highest, followed by the United 
States. Canada. Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
In summary, the evidence suggests that since the early 1980’s, the policy 
rate for each country has shown a path o f disinflationary policy. The credibility 
o f the policy has also dramatically increased.
7 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to quantify the credibility of monetary policy so as to 
evaluate the introduction o f inflation targeting. For all three targeting countries, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden, both the policy inflation and the 
credibility index have declined after the targets were announced. Therefore, 
the empirical results indicate that after the adoption o f inflation targeting the 
credibility for these countries has improved. This increase in credibility might 
result from the good intention of policymakers to keep their commitment, which 
is revealed from the inferred policy inflation.
However, with implicit inflation targets, Germany was found to maintain 
a good record o f policy inflation and high credibility since the 1970’s. The 
result from the period of January 1970 to December 1990 is consistent with 
the findings o f other work, such as Weber (1992). After January 1991, due
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to the uncertainty resulting from German reunification, credibility in Germany 
has decreased. On the other hand, the United States, which represents coun­
tries without any targets but pursuing disinflationary policy, also has enhanced 
credibility since 1991.
While the evidence shows that the credibility o f monetary policy has en­
hanced with the inflation targeting regime, simply emphasizing low inflation 
and price stability without the aimouncement of target also has helped coun­
tries to promote their credibility. Moreover, one reason that inflation targeting 
regime can dramatically bring down inflation in a short period, might be due to 
the initial disinflation experience before adopting the regime, as suggested by 
Mishkin and Posen (1997). Also, the results reveal that the credibility closely 
varies with the policy inflation. Therefore, we can conclude that the announce­
ment o f policy alone may be inadequate to establish and maintain credibility. 
The policymaker needs to show the effort o f reducing inflation, to control and 
keep the path o f inflation low, and to improve transparency and accountabil­
ity o f the policy. The public will observe these efforts and patterns so as to 
gradually adjust their expectations accordingly. Only then can the credibility o f 
monetary policy be established.
63
References
[1] Amano, Robert, Paul Fenton, David Tessier and Simon van Norden. 1997. 
“The Credibility o f Monetary Policy : A Survey of the Literature with Some 
Simple Application to Canada,” in Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy, 
Bank o f Canada Conference Series, Ottawa, Ontario: 1-64.
[2] Backus, David and John Drilfill. 1985. “Inflation and Reputation.” Ameri­
can Economic Review, vol. 75, no. 3, (June): 530-38.
[3] Barro, Robert J. 1986. "Reputation in a Model o f Monetary Policy with 
Incomplete Information.” Journal o f  Monetary Economics 17: 3-20.
[4] ________ . 1995. “Inflation and Economic Growth.”
lerly Bulletin 35 (May): 166-76.
[5] _________and David B. Gordon. 1983a. “Rules, Discretion, and Reputation
in a Model o f Monetary ^oWcy." Journal o f  Monetary Economics 12 (July): 
101-21 .
[6] _________a n d _________. 1983b. “A Positive Theory o f Monetary Policy
in a Natural-Rate Model.” Journal o f  Political Economy, vol. 91, no.4: 
589-610.
[7] Baxter, Marianne. 1985. “The Role o f Expectations in Stabilization Policy.” 
Journal o f  Monetary Economics 15: 343-62.
[8] Bemanke, Ben S. and Frederic S. Mishkin. 1997. “Inflation Targeting: A 
New Framework for Monetary Policy?” Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, 
vol. 11, no. 2, (Spring): 97-116.
[9] Bruno, Michael and William Easterly. 1995. “Inflation Crises and Long-Run 
Growth.” NBER Working Paper No. 5209.
[10] Burmeister, Edwin and Kent D. Wall. 1982. “Kalman Filtering Estimation 
of Unobserved Rational Expectations with an Application to the German 
Hyperinflation.” Journal o f  Econometrics 20: 255-84.
[11] ________, _________, and James D. Hamilton. 1986. “Estimation o f Un­
observed Expected Monthly Inflation Using Kalman Filtering.” Journal o f  
Business and Economic Statistics, vol. 4, no. 2, (April): 147-60.
64
[12] Crow, John W. 1988. “The Work o f Canadian Monetary Policy.” The Han­
son Lecture. Bank o f  Canada Review (February): 3-17.
[13] Cukierman, Alex and Allan H. Meltzer. 1986. “A Theory of Ambiguity, 
Credibility, and inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information." 
Economelrica, vol. 54, no. 5, (September): 1099-1128.
[14] Faust, Jon and Lars E.O. Svensson. 1997. “Transparency and Credibility: 
Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals.” IIES Seminar Paper No 636, 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1852 and NBER Working Paper No. 6452.
[15] Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 1996. Achieving Price Stability, Fed­
eral Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium Series, Kansas City, Mo.
[16] Fisher, Stanley. 1981. “Towards an Understanding o f the Cost of Inflation: 
11,” in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, eds.. The Costs and Conse­
quences o f  Inflating, Camegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Pol­
icy, vol. 15, North-Holland: 5-42.
[17] ________ . 1996. “Why Are Central Banks Pursuing Long-Run Price Sta­
bility?” Federal Reserve Bank o f Kansas City, Achieving Price Stability, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium Series, Kansas City, Mo: 
7-34.
[18] Hamilton, James D. 1985. “Uncovering Financial Market Expectations o f 
Inflation.” Journal o f  Political Economy, vol. 93, no. 6 : 1224-41.
[19] ________ . 1994a. Time Series Analysis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer­
sity Press.
[20] ________ . 1994b. “State-Space Models,” in Robert F. Engle and Daniel L.
McFadden, eds.. Handbook o f  Econometrics, vol. 4.
[21] Hardouvelis, Gikas A. and Scott W. Barnhart. 1989. “The Evolution o f 
Federal Reserve Credibility: 1978-1984.” The Review o f  Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 71, no. 2, (August): 385-93.
[22] Harvey, Andrew C. 1989. Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and 
the Kalman Filter. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
[23] Johnson, David. 1998. “The Credibility of Monetary Policy: International
6 5
Evidence Based on Surveys of Expected Inflation,” Bank of Canada, Price 
Stability, Inflation Targets, and Monetary Policy, Bank o f Canada Confer­
ence Series, Ottawa, Ontario: 361-95.
[24] Kahn, George A. and Klara Parrish. 1998. “Conducting Monetary Policy 
with Inflation Targets.” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic 
Review, vol. 83, no. 3, (Third Quarter): 5-32.
[25] Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott. 1977. “Rules Rather Than Dis­
cretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” Journal o f  Political Economy, 
vol. 85, no. 3, (June): 473-91.
[26] Lafrance, Robert. 1997. “Background Paper: The Monetary Frameworks 
o f Four Inflation-Targeting Countries,” Bank o f Canada, Price Stability, 
Inflation Targets, and Monetary Policy, Bank of Canada Conference Series, 
Ottawa, Ontario: 245-60.
[27] Leiderman. Leonardo and Lars E.O. Svensson, eds., 1995. Inflation Targets, 
CEPR, London.
[28] McCallum, Bennett T. 1996. “Inflation Targeting in Canada, New Zealand, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and in General.” NBER Working Paper No. 
5579.
[29] Mishkin, Frederic S. and Adam S. Posen. 1997. “Inflation Targeting: 
Lessons from Four Countries.” Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, 
Economic Policy Review, vol. 3, no. 3, (August): 9-110.
[30] Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J. 1995. “Credibility and Changes in Policy 
Re^,\me." Journal o f  Political Economy, vol. 103, no. 1: 176-208.
[31 ] Weber, Axel A. 1992. “The Role of Policymakers’ Reputation in the EMS 
Disinflations: An Empirical Evaluation.” European Economic Review 36: 
1473-92.
6 6
Table 1.
Param eters C anada United Kingdom Sweden G erm any United States
5, 0.4999***
(0.1045)
0.2515***
(0.0914)
0.2798***
(0.0317)
0.5973*
(0.3217)
0.0705
(0.0600)
§2 0.3312***
(0.0577)
0.6421**
(0.2715)
0.7572***
(0.17108)
0.2194
(0.2151)
0.9197***
(0.0493)
Yi 0.7942***
(0.0982)
0.8265***
(0.2441)
0.7201***
(0.0317)
0.8301***
(0.2270)
1.1057***
(0.0777)
72 0.7766***
(0.1537)
0.4941
(0.3875)
0.2427
(0.1711)
0.4619
(0.3510)
0.2763***
(0.0656)
73 -0.2149***
(0.0571)
-0.1019
(0.1273)
0.00008***
(0 .00002 )
-0.0526
(0.0368)
-0.1881***
(0.0712)
0.00342**"
(0.0013)
-0.0032
(0.0035)
0.0000001
(0.000015)
-0.0009**
(0.0004)
-0.0069***
(0.0014)
ay -0.00974**
(0.0045)
-0.0000002
(2.0214)
0.00003
(0.0056)
-0.0000006
(1.10604)
0.00001
(23.843)
0.00011
(0.3028)
0.0151*
(0.0059)
0.00012
(0 .0012 )
0.0049***
(0.0015)
-0.0175
(0.0395)
\ogL 903.38 731.23 2591.41 1286.80 718.63
Note: Standard errors are given in paraentheses.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level.
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Table 2.
70:1 -  80:12 81:1 -  89:12 90:1 -  97:6 70:1 -  97:6
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
Canada 4.386 2.689 3.485 3.139 1.412 1.100 3.277 3.848
United
Kingdom
7.768 11.486 3.665 2.494 2.361 2.364 4.942 11.563
Sweden 4.244 1.732 3.361 1.342 1.940 3.291 3.324 2.882
Germany 3.208 0.899 1.697 1.870 1.959 0.828 2.370 1.667
United
States
4.201 4.247 2.275 1.538 1.729 0.441 2.892 3.485
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